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Public engagement with UK government data science: Propositions from a literature 
review of public engagement on new technologies 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
We develop five propositions for public engagement on government data science. 
1. Consider the ‘publics’ who may be engaged in government data science. 
2. Do not assume providing information will lead to public acceptance. 
3. Determine contingencies of trust  
4. Design deliberative engagements. 





1. INTRODUCTION  
While data is nothing new, in recent years there has been a revolution in the 
mechanisms of creating, collecting, processing, connecting, and applying data. In the United 
Kingdom (UK), the recent passing of the Investigatory Powers Act (Investigatory Powers Act 
2016, 2016; MacAskill, 2016) evidences that government, in particular, is attentive to these 
new possibilities that data affords. Indeed, it has a large stake in the development and use of 
‘data science’. Traditionally government is positioned as a regulator of new technologies 
such as genetic modification and nanotechnology (M Kearnes, Macnaghten, & Wilsdon, 
2006; J Stilgoe, 2007), however it is both the producer and consumer of data science in the 
UK. This metaphorically muddies the waters since data science both informs government 
policy yet must also be regulated by government. Whilst private sector corporations tend to 
use data science to expand their business interests (N.A., 2016), governments use data 
relating to citizen activity to inform decision making across domains ranging from the 
collection of household waste to tracking terrorist activity (MacAskill, 2016).   
A range of recent high profile events such as Care.Data (Carter, Laurie, & Dixon-
Woods, 2015) have shown that government data use can be judged as unacceptable, and in 
the case of Edward Snowden reveal unprecedented invasions of privacy and civil rights 
(Greenwald, MacAskill, & Poitras, 2013). This also demonstrates how individuals are 
uniquely tied to data science as a technology due to them often providing the data that 
government use. Building on this, the argument that this paper advances is that the precarious 
basis for government self-regulation heightens the importance of including diverse public 
voices in the realm of data science. This paper contributes five propositions developed from a 
thematic synthesis of public engagement literature on science and technology for how and 
why government should include these public voices. The focus of these propositions is on 
government activities, however there are of course many ways in which publics self-organise 
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and themselves seek conversations on data science with government (Braun & Konninger, 
2017; Lezaun & Soneryd, 2007; Selin et al., 2017). While we do not offer propositions for 
these publics, we recognise that the high profile events mentioned above are often driven by 
publics and open spaces for these same publics to take part in government activity.   
In the light of previous cases of public disaffection around the introduction of new 
technology, as well as early examples of publicity around data being shared in ways that 
breach public expectations, it is unsurprising that government has started to initiate public 
engagement processes around data science. We seek to inform our consideration of the 
potential for public engagement with data science through a critical analysis of engagement 
and trust building in other new technologies. In the background, we first establish definitional 
clarity on public engagement and data science before outlining the interface between data 
science and the citizenry. We then consider some early examples of public disquiet around 
government data practices. Following this we describe the methodology used in the narrative 
literature review. In the first half of the discussion, we outline five themes drawn from 
literature around new technology and public engagement. The second half of our discussion 
develops these themes into five propositions for data science public engagement in 
government. We situate the second half of the discussion within examples of how 
government has begun to engage around data science to consider the relevance of previous 
public engagement practice to government data science, as well as how we may use the tenets 
of decentred governance to stimulate theoretical reflection on these propositions.  
 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
2.1 Definitions and conceptions of public engagement  
Broadly engagement is defined as the inclusion of publics in some aspect of the 
development or regulation of policy or technology (Rowe & Frewer, 2005). Rowe and 
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Frewer (2005) categorise public engagement as communication, consultation, or 
participation. In these three categories the nature of public involvement changes from 
informing publics about some aspect of a technology to the participation of publics in the 
deliberation and development of technology. In an alternative classification pertaining more 
to the motivations of the instigator of engagement than to the methods used to engage, 
Fiorino (1990) and later Stirling (2004) describe engagement as either normative, substantive, 
or instrumental. Under a normative perspective publics are seen as having a democratic right 
to engagement in relation to a new technology, for example by virtue of living in an area 
affected by its siting. A substantive perspective positions publics as able to make a difference 
by virtue of their engagement. For example, publics could be involved in developing a new 
transport system and provide insight about features that would be most valued. Adopting an 
instrumental perspective would include publics as a means to an end (Barnett, Cooper, & 
Senior, 2007), for example as a mechanism of minimising controversy or unwanted media 
attention.  
While these are useful frameworks, there is no prominent theory of public 
engagement and thus engagement encapsulates a broad range of public-technology 
interactions. We define public engagement as a subset of democratic activity that focuses 
specifically on the inclusion of non-technical publics in the development and governance of 
new technologies. In the case of data science in the UK, this includes a range of activities 
related to including publics in the development and regulation of government data usage that 
are not government officials, data scientists, nor other technical publics.   
2.2 Defining data science 
While traditionally defined as the processes of combining and applying data, we use 
the term data science to represent both the substance and application of data. This includes 
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both novel types of data like big data and novel applications of data. Included within data 
science is the concept of open data which refers to data sets that are released in the public 
domain (Hand, 2013). Definitions of big data are more contentious with early classifications 
relating to particular characteristics, famously first as the three Vs of velocity, volume, and 
variety (McNeely & Hamh, 2014)  but it has also been defined according to its political and 
social implications by Markus and Topi (2015, p. 3) who call for “a sociotechnical 
perspective, viewing Big Data as a cluster or assemblage of data-related ideas, resources, and 
practices.” We consider data science to include both the technical practices of data usage and 
data technology development, but also the ways that data science interacts with and informs 
social and political practice. Data science is a term typically used in the UK, thus the 
literature we draw on and the public engagement propositions developed are most relevant to 
the UK context. We include some international literature, mostly from the US, but the 
arguments made here are based on the UK context. The UK has a rich history of public 
engagement, as well as a strong and burgeoning interest in data-based decision-making. Thus 
these dual interests in public engagement and data science provide a highly relevant context 
for considering public engagement on data practices. It is vital to be clear that our focus is on 
how publics may engage with the regulation and potential applications of data science and 
not public engagement using data. We are not focussing on how data technologies can be 
used as a means of engagement, for example government using social media for 
communication or citizens using social media to organise protests (Lee & Kwak, 2012; 
Warren, Sulaiman, & Jaafar, 2014), but rather how public engagement on data science and its 
various contingencies can be done.  
2.3 Governments, citizens, and the future of data science 
From Twitter feeds and sentiment analysis, to store card data and marketing, data and 
data science are claimed to hold vast potential to improve the efficiency of government 
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processes and enhance policy development (Gov.UK Blog, 2015). Complex analytics are 
being used to predict likely crime scenes in Los Angeles while Facebook ‘likes’ have been 
piloted for public health monitoring in Florida (Gittelman et al., 2015; PredPol, 2015). The 
UK Department for Education recently proposed a register in England which would link 
diverse data on every school and student (Vale, 2016) while, the Investigatory Powers Act 
(2016) allows for full-scale web-scraping of all citizens’ Internet use (MacAskill, 2016). 
There is not only a proliferation of data but of applications through which government can 
surveil and ultimately regulate the citizenry. And as highlighted through the Snowden case, 
these applications are not always deemed to be in the public interest.  
The routines, interactions, and practices of citizens are inevitably intertwined – albeit 
often unknowingly - with the production and use of data science. As a citizenry our actions 
are translated in to data in a multitude of ways (Johnson, 2014). For example, by directly 
filling out administrative forms and clicking links online but also through entering a car park 
that uses ground sensors. Governance and policy-making for health, employment, banking, 
transport, education, justice, and housing, to various degrees, involve the production of data 
that can in theory contribute to better outcomes for citizens and government (Joseph & 
Johnson, 2013). Such outcomes might include enhancing how we interact with various 
organisations which can in turn realise benefits of saving time or money (Hancock, 2016). 
However, our relationships with data science may be less passive, for example utilising 
online information about housing to decide where to live to interactive mapping exercises 
like Map Kibera that take advantage of local knowledge to overcome shortfalls in 
government transparency (Donovan, 2012). In this sense, data science, government, and the 
citizenry exist in a complex data ecosystem with varying, and perhaps decreasing in the case 
of the citizenry, levels of power and influence. A key message from these tightly intertwined 
processes is that publics have a fundamental stake in the results and development of data 
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science techniques, whether that is in the improvement of that technology or the regulation of 
its use.  
2.4 Early evidence of public disquiet around government use of data 
In common with the introduction and development of a range of technologies, public 
disquiet and disaffection with the use of public data by governments has coalesced around 
several high profile incidents in recent years. In late April 2016, New Scientist reported that 
the Google-owned machine learning firm DeepMind had unprecedented access to all patient 
records from London hospitals run by the NHS Royal Free Trust (N.A., 2016) resulting in 
concern with regard to the unconstrained sharing of private medical records. In 2014, 
following concerns around the sharing of personal medical information, the NHS data 
strategy Care.Data was cancelled (Boseley, 2016). Publics are often uncomfortable with 
commercial access to private data, and prefer data science that has a clear element of public 
good (Cameron, Pope, Clemence, & Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute, 2014; Davidson 
et al., 2013; Ipsos MORI, 2016). This suggests interest from publics in the kinds of data that 
government collect and how they are ultimately used. Hence, data science has entered in to 
conversations around public engagement with data science acceptability, privacy, and consent 
(Gov.UK Blog, 2015; Sciencewise, 2012, 2014).  
In light of these early examples of public concern, as well as the precarious basis for 
government self-regulation of data science, we argue for a more nuanced study of public 
engagement in data science. We advocate, of course, for transparency on what government 
does with data but the answer to the relatively simple question of whether individuals should 
know what is happening to their data is assumed to be yes. Publics should know what 
happens to their information, particularly when data science based technologies have the 
potential to do harm. Due to these potential social and societal effects, data is a sociotechnical 
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object and there are critical questions around the interactions between society, government, 
and data science that need to be queried and deliberated by publics. Thus we now move on 
first to present our methodology and second to discuss how the history of public engagement 
with new technologies can help to develop models for public engagement with government 
data science.   
3. METHODOLOGY 
Our aim is to examine the potential for public engagement with data science through a 
narrative literature review of public engagement with other technologies. A narrative 
literature review focuses on critically developing new models by synthesising the ‘most 
significant items in the field’ (Grant & Booth, 2009, p. 94), and does not formally assess the 
quality of the literature included. A narrative review was chosen due to the broad nature of 
the research question (e.g. any new technology and public engagement of any form) as well 
as the desire to include texts that were not empirical in the review. Our main focus is on 
synthesising lessons from these texts to develop the propositions for government data science 
public engagement rather than to systematically analyse the literature. While the public 
engagements synthesised in this paper cover a range of different technologies, these 
technologies have all faced the same question now confronting government data science. 
Namely, how to effectively include publics in the development and governance of 
sociotechnical objects? We take this indirect approach as data science is still a new 
technology and subsequently there is not a large literature on public engagements with data 





Table 1: Search terms and databases 
 
Search terms used 
 
    Public Public* OR People* OR Societ* OR 
Communit* OR Populace OR Citizen* OR 
Person* OR Patient* 
    Engagement Engagement OR Consultation OR Dialogue 
OR Involvement OR Discourse OR 
Participation OR Communicaton1  
Risk* OR Perception*  OR Acceptance*  
OR View*  OR Opinion* OR Knowledge 
OR Attitude* OR Awareness OR 
Impression* OR Viewpoint* 
    Trust Trust* OR Confidence 
    New Technology "Emerging *Technolog*" OR "New 
*Technolog*" OR "Modern *Technolog*" 
OR "Novel *Technolog*" OR "Developing 
*Technolog*" OR "Rising *Technolog*" 
Databases searched Scopus, Web of Science, and PsycINFO 
1 This word was spelled incorrectly in the original database search. 
 
We extracted relevant literature based on a review of the abstract and title, including 
both peer-reviewed and grey literature. Search terms used and databases searched are 
presented in Table 1. Relevance was decided based on whether the article focused on any 
kind of public opinion-seeking or engagement with a new technology. The technology had to 
involve some kind of science application. We also included literature suggested by the second 
author based on her expert opinion. Trust was used due to expert advice and it’s prevalence in 
early reading around nanotechnology engagement, see Wynne (2006) and Walls et al. (2004). 
The articles were read for themes common to engagement, we followed Braun and Clarke's 
(2006) methods of reviewing, coding, categorising, and re-categorising key themes. We 
extracted common themes from a total of 49 articles. A full list of these 49 articles is 
available in Appendix 1. Articles were included until thematic saturation was reached, i.e. 
that no new themes were found in new articles. Primary themes were first developed by the 
lead author then grouped and revaluated by the team. An initial 12 themes were identified 
which were then combined and simplified which are presented in Table 2. These themes were 
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then used to develop five propositions for public engagement with government data science. 
These propositions and their connecting theme are presented in Table 3.  We further consider 
the value of the propositions by then evaluating their relevance to public engagement and 
governance theory. While Rowe and Frewer (2005) and Fiorino (1990) provide useful 
frameworks of public engagement, they do not provide a theoretical foundation for thinking 
about how public engagement, as a concept, fits in government and the governance of 
technology. In this vein, Braun and Konninger (2017) call for public engagement to be 
evaluated through a holistic, theoretical lens of decentred governance of science and 
technology. Engagement is then not about finite, defined public consultations but is 
underlined by the view of politics “as activities of struggle and conflict concerning the 
meaning of particular issues that inevitably involve power relations” (pg. 10). They suggest 
“to take controversy and contestation as a point of departure and study how controversies, 
publics and issues are brought into being” (pg. 11). Considering the propositions identified in 
the literature, we evaluate how they can be linked to key tenets and principles of decentred 
governance. The four tenets we draw on are the recognition of power relations, allowances 
for pluralism, moving the regulation of technology outside of central government structures, 
and examining sites of contestation as sites of public engagement (Griggs, Norval, & 
Wagenaar, 2014).  
Table 2: Initial and final thematic analysis of public engagement literature results 
Initial twelve themes 1) Trust versus robustness as the purpose of 
engagement.  
2) Public understanding leads to success of new 
technologies.  
3) Critiques of the view that people and trust halt 
technological development.  
4) Transparency will lead to trust.  
5) Deliberation is conceived as small group 
discussions.  




7) New technologies will have unique public risks, 
unlike other technologies thus context is 
important.  
8) Stereotypes of the evil market versus the 
irrational activities in engagement activities.  
9) Public involvement (participation) will lead to 
success of new technologies.  
10) Risk is multifaceted.  
11) Upstream deliberation is key to public 
engagement but is often not done in practice.  
12) Publics and other stakeholders often have 
unshared socio-technical imaginaries of the future. 
Five final themes 1) Conceptions of the public in engagement.  
2) A knowledge deficit and other early science-
citizen interactions.  
3) Trust and trustworthiness in public engagement. 
4) How aims predict methodologies in public 
engagement.  
5) Imaginaries of the future in public engagement 
 
4. A REVIEW OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT WITH NEW TECHNOLOGY 
This first half of our discussion introduces the five common themes found in the 
literature on public engagement with new technology, while in the second half we develop 
these themes into propositions for government-driven public engagement with data science. 
Examples of data science engagement and applications are therefore also presented in Section 
5. We include literature around various new technologies that are often applications of 
scientific principles. In line with Nightingale (2014) in considering technologies, we include 
both the infrastructure and context around technologies that are in essence part of the 
technologies themselves. For additional reading on themes in public engagement see Braun 
and Konninger (2017) and Smallman (2016). First, we discuss conceptions of publics that 
may be involved in engagement. Second, we outline early initiatives of science-society 
interactions including the development of the Deficit Model. Next, we discuss lessons for 
engagement in terms of trust building. Our fourth section describes various methodologies of 
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engagement and how we might move beyond event-based engagement. Finally, we discuss 
imaginaries of the future and how these impact the potential for public engagement.  
4.1 How to define the ‘public’ 
Public engagement, necessarily, involves explicitly or implicitly defining who the 
public are by deciding who to engage with. Engagement is often about “finding ways of 
connecting with people who could be mobilised as supporters” (Walker, Cass, Burningham, 
& Barnett, 2010, p. 942).  Various positions are taken relating to whether publics are finite 
pre-existing groups or constructed and dynamic. Renn (2008) argues for four categories of 
publics: stakeholders, affected publics, observing publics, and the general public where the 
general public is the whole or unaffected public. In contrast, Newman (2011) suggests that 
publics do not pre-exist, rather that public leaders call upon or create publics for a given 
purpose. Within engagements, the ‘real’ public is often assumed to be the supportive, silent 
majority (Burningham, Barnett, & Walker, 2014). In the case of renewable energy 
technology, Burningham et al. (2014) found publics who oppose new technology were 
framed as an irrational minority. For example, a common narrative places activists as an 
unreasonable leftist minority and demonises industry as representing rightist market forces 
(Barnett, Burningham, Walker, & Cass, 2010; Laurent, 2007; Shelley-Egan & Davies, 2013; 
Torgersen & Schmidt, 2013). Laurent (2007) similarly found these tendencies to resort to 
stereotypes were a common feature of public-industrial interactions around nanotechnology. 
Government, and other technology stakeholders, often have imaginations of who the public 
are and what they may feel prior to starting any form of engagement. Furthermore, the mental 
models that are held of publics and the attributions made about their interests, capabilities, 
and likely behaviours will determine the nature and extent of the engagement opportunities 
that are provided (Barnett et al., 2010).  Thus, defining ‘the public’ also defines the spaces for 
public engagement.  
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4.2 A knowledge deficit and other early science-citizen interactions 
The early history of public-technology interactions, later termed public engagement, 
were framed around the deficit model. This model posits that citizens have a deficit of 
knowledge around science and technology, and that lack of knowledge drives rejection of 
technology and scientific ideals. Sturgis and Allum (2004, p. 56) suggest “[implicit] in this 
programmatic agenda is the claim that ‘to know science is to love it’.” The deficit model 
emerged from early science-citizen interactions around technologies such as nuclear power 
and bioactive substances like thalidomide (Wynne, 2006).  In the case of thalidomide, public 
concerns arose from associations of a causative link between a particular drug and birth 
defects with more general concerns around science and technology. However, in relation to 
technologies such as nuclear power, there was an underlying assumption that concern arose 
from a lack of understanding and knowledge (Grove-White et al., 2004; Wynne, 2006). The 
“assumption was that no rational and properly informed person could possibly disagree with 
the desirability of whatever science endorsed – nuclear power, chemical pesticides, 
chlorofluorocarbons” (Wynne, 2006, p. 215). Following this logic, the method to improve 
public acceptance (and to ensure the unimpeded progress of such technologies) is to educate 
and inform the public. This synthesis of communication (Rowe & Frewer, 2005) with 
instrumental engagement (Fiorino, 1990) was seen in initiatives to inform the general public 
about technologies to thus ensure their acceptance.  
While Sturgis and Allum (2004, p. 55) point out that a “scientifically literate citizenry 
is also one that can effectively participate in public debates about science”, critics of the 
deficit model take issue with the belief that knowledge about technology guarantees 
acceptance (M Kearnes et al., 2006; J Stilgoe, 2007; J Stilgoe, Irwin, & Jones, 2006; 
Wilsdon, Wynne, & Stilgoe, 2005; Wynne, 2006). As Williams, Macnaghten, Davies, and 
Curtis (2015, pp. 98-99) argue in their recent critique of deficit-like assumptions in fracking 
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engagement, there “is no guarantee that more information will lead to greater acceptance, or 
that the availability of facts will lead to a more ‘rational’ and calculative form of choice-
making.”  In fact, the deficit model reduces publics to mere receivers of information. As 
Wynne (2006, p. 215)  emphatically characterizes,  the deficit model is “dogmatically 
authoritarian and arrogantly self-centred.” Knowledge provision, while a component of 
public engagement, is not sufficient to engage publics in any significant way.  
4.3 Trust and trustworthiness in public engagement 
In the wake of, and as a response to the dominance of the deficit model, engagement 
exercises were seen as a method of building trust in new technologies (Burningham et al., 
2014; Grove-White, Macnaghten, & Wynne, 2000; Groves, 2011; M. Kearnes & Wynne, 
2007; Marris & Rose, 2010; J Stilgoe, 2007; The Global Environmental Change Programme, 
1999; Torgersen & Schmidt, 2013; Wilsdon et al., 2005). Trust, or a “firm belief in the 
reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something” (Oxford University Press, 2017), is 
often cited as key to successful science-citizen interactions. As Warburton (2009, p. 32) 
reflected after the failure of a nuclear power consultation, an “atmosphere of hostility, caution 
and anxiety is not conducive to the flexible and creative environment that is ideal for the 
design and delivery of engagement activities.” A lack of trust is problematic. The role of trust 
is reflected in the genetically modified organism (GMO) and bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) events of the mid-1990s where publics’ concern arose around the 
potentially harmful effects of genetically modifying crops and poor food safety. Trust was 
diminished following minimal communication and transparency on uncertainties in these 
technologies, prompting what the UK House of Lords (2000) deemed a crisis of trust in 
science. By the mid-2000s, engagement around trust building for things like nanotechnology 
was commonplace (Groves, 2011; M Kearnes et al., 2006). 
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Critics of trust building argue it is premised on the same faulty assumption as the 
deficit model, i.e. the public are a problem (M. Kearnes & Wynne, 2007; J. Stilgoe, Lock, & 
Wilsdon, 2014). As Groves (2011, p. 792) describes, trust building “sees technology and 
expertise as threatened by dynamics of distrust that disrupt what is imagined as a pre-existing 
condition of consensual trust in the promises of science”. The assumption is that “the 
prevailing deficit of public confidence…will be improved through the direct consultation and 
active engagement [of] lay-public concerns” (M. Kearnes & Wynne, 2007, p. 133). Public 
involvement then becomes about filling a deficit of trust (Burgess, 2014; Groves, 2011; 
Involve, 2015; Ipsos MORI, 2006; M. Kearnes & Wynne, 2007). A focus on trust can, 
therefore, be seen as merely another instrumental mechanism of preventing public 
controversy (Krütli, Stauffacher, Flüeler, & Scholz, 2010; Marris & Rose, 2010). As J Stilgoe 
et al. (2006, p. 20) argue, “[the] focus on trust turns the problem into one of communication. 
And the deliberate attempt to manufacture trust can look deeply untrustworthy.” Public 
engagements that focus on building trust risk doing the opposite. While trust is a component 
of public and government interactions, it should not be the aim of public engagement. Similar 
to communication, trust is necessary but not sufficient.   
J Stilgoe et al. (2006, p. 21) advocate that “[we] must instead focus on what goes into 
building trustworthiness”. This move from trust to trustworthiness was central to shifting 
public engagement away from the ‘public as burden’ argument. Instead of the onus being on 
publics to gain trust, regulators and developers are instead responsible for inspiring trust. 
There are several key features of trustworthiness, a common argument being that 
transparency will lead to trust (Flynn, Ricci, & Bellaby, 2012; M. Kearnes & Wynne, 2007; 
O'Hara, 2012; Shelley-Egan & Davies, 2013; Stebbing, 2009). Transparency is public 
openness in the development and regulation of new technologies, but also in the engagement 
process itself, e.g. trust that public voices will in fact be heard and not marginalised during 
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public engagements (Warburton, 2009). This openness is often operationalised as releasing 
data sets, reporting of minutes, and various other practices of being as clear as possible in 
how something is developed and conclusions about it are drawn. Stebbing (2009, p. 41), in 
her review of the potential for nanotechnology engagement, argued for “governance that is 
based on transparency and accountability at the local rather than global level”. Thus the 
concepts of transparency and accountability are closely linked. The argument is if governance 
and development are open then government and industry are accountable for good practice in 
technology development. While transparency and openness in innovation are components of 
good practice, particularly in government, transparency rests on the assumption that if the 
processes behind innovation are more widely publicised, developers might do the right thing 
(M. Kearnes & Wynne, 2007). Transparency is not a replacement for public engagement, it 
merely facilitates the potential for successful engagement to take place.  
A second feature of being trustworthy is understanding that trust is multifaceted. For 
example, Walls, Pidgeon, Weyman, and Horlick-Jones (2004) suggest that trust in 
government agencies is rarely simple, it is a critical trust. Publics have neither blind belief 
nor total scepticism in government agencies. Instead “perceptions and understandings of 
government agencies and departments are vague and…susceptible to contingencies of 
events” (Walls et al., 2004, p. 145). For example, Barnett et al. (2007) found that having a 
stronger belief in public efficacy was associated with having greater trust in genetic science 
but conversely lower trust in government. Trust becomes attached to different events, 
histories, and organisations. Walls et al. (2004, p. 135) call for “a situation whereby trust is 
provisionally conceptualised as multi-faceted, potentially dynamic, and dependent upon a 
range of contextual variables.” Trustworthy practice requires consideration of these different 
histories and contexts of individuals and publics who may interact with new technologies, as 
well as the complexity of public views on government.  
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4.4 Linking the aims and methodologies of public engagement  
If trust and communication are only components of engagement, and not the goal, 
then what is the aim of public engagement? Groves (2011, p. 787) suggests building 
robustness, i.e. “produc[ing] forms of technology which are explicitly embedded in different 
ways of domesticating uncertainty”. A focus on robustness aims to encourage public 
participation that emphasises negotiating technological development and governance and 
creates feedback mechanisms between stakeholders and publics. This shifts engagement 
away from ‘public as problem’ and towards ‘public as partner’ (J Stilgoe, 2007). Robustness 
aligns, to some degree, with Fiorino’s (1990) substantive and normative aims of engagement. 
Normative engagement positions publics as due a role in technological development while 
substantive engagement posits that publics can improve technology. Hence, publics can 
provide a unique perspective on the purposes and design of technologies and thus build social 
and technological robustness.  
The aim of engagement is fundamentally linked to how to engage. For 
communication or trust building purposes, engagement could be typified by providing 
information. With a normative aim, engagement could include public workshops and early 
consultation on public opinion and under a substantive viewpoint engagement could involve 
working groups that ask publics to help develop and design a new technology. Building 
robustness requires both substantive and normative methodologies of engagement. Bonney, 
Phillips, Ballard, and Enck (2016) highlight the importance of offering multiple sites for 
participation, e.g. offering more than one way and one time period for people to engage. They 
suggest that publics are empowered through involvement in question development thus so-
called upstream deliberation is key to public engagement (Burri & Bellucci, 2008; Grove-
White et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2014; M Kearnes et al., 2006; Pidgeon, Harthorn, Bryant, & 
Rogers-Hayden, 2009; The Global Environmental Change Programme, 1999; Willis & 
18 
 
Wilsdon, n.d.; Wilsdon et al., 2005). Burri and Bellucci (2008, p. 387) highlight the 
“consensus that the public should be involved in deliberative discussions and assessments of 
emerging technologies at a much earlier stage of technological developments.” However, 
authors caution that engagement should be at the right time rather than simply early as early 
engagements can result in “participants [that] are difficult to find and to engage, they often 
discuss half-heartedly in an artificial setting” (Torgersen & Schmidt, 2013, p. 52) In other 
words, if individuals are engaged under a normative or substantive aim then that engagement 
must have a meaningful impact on technological development.  
The vast majority of engagement exercises reviewed in developing this paper were 
time-limited small group discussions, such as workshops or focus groups (Burri & Bellucci, 
2008; Flynn et al., 2012; Ipsos MORI, 2006; Jones et al., 2014; M Kearnes et al., 2006; 
Pidgeon et al., 2009; J Stilgoe, 2007; Walker et al., 2010). Pidgeon et al. (2009) and M 
Kearnes et al. (2006), for example, conducted workshops that included presentation, 
discussion, and hypothetical deliberation around nanotechnology. Flynn et al. (2012) held 
Citizens’ Panels around hydrogen energy that used presentation, discussion with experts, and 
again hypothetical deliberation. In this literature, public engagement is often one-off events. 
That is not to say that all engagement is still event-based, drawing from policy literature that 
is not on the topic of science and technology but nevertheless involves some form of 
government-public interaction, forms of digital engagement are emerging (Gagliardi et al., 
2017; Panagiotopoulos, Al-Debei, Fitzgerald, & Elliman, 2012). An example is Lauriault and 
Mooney’s (2014) descriptions of crowdsourcing mapping and other forms of collaborative 
work. A clear lesson is that these kinds of more involved, participatory engagements are 
preferable over the older one-off event-style engagements, and that both kinds of engagement 
persist in today’s government-citizen interactions.  
4.5 Imaginaries of the future for data science engagement 
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Engagement generally falls around two main topics: regulation and development. The 
former being more common than the latter. For example, Flynn et al. (2012) asked 
participants to debate the potential for a hydrogen economy and drew out themes on hazards, 
risks, trust, and regulation. Similarly, Burri and Bellucci (2008, p. 388) asked participants to 
discuss the potential for nanotechnology with an aim at stimulating debate and “to help 
decision makers in assessing nanotechnologies.” While development is a rarer topic, it can be 
framed by theories of co-design and participatory research (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995), where 
in essence publics are engaged through the technology design process itself. Burgess (2014) 
describes a hybrid where publics were engaged in discussions around genetic technologies 
and involved in governance along the research process. However, what is missing in these 
topics is the very first stage of development, i.e. what technologies are developed and why?  
Groves (2011), M Kearnes et al. (2006) and J Stilgoe et al. (2006) describe these 
visions of the future as sociotechnical imaginaries, or narratives of how society envisions the 
future. These imaginaries create the boundaries for what is and is not acceptable in 
technological development, and are developed through complex socio-technical relationships 
between industry, academia, media, publics, and government. Groves (2011) argues that the 
dominant imaginary is an empty future horizon. This empty future is one where anything is 
possible and if anything is possible then there are no limits on development or developer 
autonomy. However, if there are no limits then what role is there for publics to shape what 
the future looks like? Some authors argue that ambivalence around new technology often 
masks a deeply engrained fatalism in public engagement exercises (Grove-White, 
Macnaghten, Mayer, & Wynne, 1997; M. Kearnes & Wynne, 2007). Essentially publics do 
not feel like they can make a difference. Groves (2011, p. 792) goes as far as to call upon 
industry and government to conceive of engagement “as a constitutive part of a democratic 
rewriting of the contract between strategic techno-science and society.” The challenge is to 
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allow engagement to be about negotiation and not consultation or communication. Only by 
first allowing publics to have input on what the future can look like, can more specific 
engagement, such as regulation or development occur.  
5. PROPOSITIONS FOR GOVERNMENT-DRIVEN DATA SCIENCE  
In the second half of our discussion, we address how each of the themes identified in the 
literature can be used to build a single proposition for government data science public 
engagement. In doing so we reflect on current and previous government-based data science 
engagements as well as how the theory of decentred governance can be applied to better 
understand the theoretical dimensions of the propositions. The connection between the 
literature review themes and the propositions is presented in Table 3 where each proposition 
was developed from one theme found in the literature. While, the previous section focussed 
on discussing and qualifying the themes we synthesised, this next section turns to evaluating 
their relevance to data science in government.  We do so by drawing on examples of data 
practice in government as well as a key underpinning theory relevant to including publics in 
governance, i.e. decentred governance.  
Table 3: Literature review lessons and propositions for government data science in the UK 
Public Engagement Literature Theme 
Identified 
 Proposition for Government Data Science 
Variations in how to define the ‘public’ → 
Consider the varied and many ‘publics’ who 
may be engaged in government data science. 
The focus on the knowledge deficit model 
in early science-citizen interactions 
→ 
Do not assume providing publics with 
information on data science initiatives will lead 
to public acceptance. 
A shift towards a focus on trust and 
trustworthiness in public engagement 
→ 
Determine the contingencies of trust for 
government data science and public 
engagement through trustworthy practice 
How the aim impacts the methodology of 
public engagement 
→ 
Design public engagements that incorporate 




The importance in considering 
imaginaries of the future for data science 
engagement 
→ 
Ensure holistic public participation that moves 
beyond privacy and consent 
 
5.1 Proposition One: Consider the varied and many ‘publics’ who may be engaged in 
government data science 
While identifying the potential publics in any data science project ultimately rests on 
the specifics of the project itself, it is nevertheless important to consider the potential publics 
that one may engage with. As with any engagement exercise there are both vast and discrete 
potential publics, however in practice it is possible to find a subset of the public with whom it 
is more relevant to engage. Therefore, policy-makers initiating public engagement will 
benefit from reflecting on how to best characterise and access relevant publics in line with 
their specific purpose. Data science can also be used to segment populations to identify 
previously uncategorised groups, for example children in need of educational assistance or 
individuals most likely to default on a loan (Ginnis et al., 2016; Joseph & Johnson, 2013). 
And while there are positive and negative aspects to identifying and grouping individuals in 
this way, it nevertheless requires critical reflection on how to ensure these new publics are 
both aware of and participants in data science. There are increasingly publics that are already 
organised and self-identified in relation to data science. Civic hacking groups, in essence 
public professionals, and associated hackathons offer, in theory, a resource for citizens with 
non-technical skills to engage with data science. For example, a local civic data group in the 
UK, Bath: Hacked, recently involved a group of 23 volunteers in a public exercise to create 
online accessibility maps. Similarly, Lauriault and Mooney (2014) describe a range of group 
mapping exercises from crowdsourcing to more intensive citizen science. Considering the 
many and varied publics allows for a range of different opinions to come forward on data 
science, this is closely linked to the decentred governance tenet of pluralism. Pluralism 
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doesn’t require a consensus from these groups, rather it allows for the reality of the many 
different ways of looking at an issue. Government must, therefore, include a range of publics 
in data science engagement to fully capture the pluralism of data science governance.  
5.2 Proposition Two: Do not assume providing publics with information on data science 
initiatives will lead to public acceptance 
Events related to Care.Data illustrate that discussions around government data science 
were predicated on a deficit model. Care.Data was a data sharing programme that proposed 
linking general practice records across England. In early 2013, NHS England ran a leaflet 
information campaign to inform the public of the Care.Data initiative. The NHS assumed that 
providing knowledge would be sufficient to establish, as Carter et al. (2015) describe, a social 
license to reuse medical data. However, the poor quality of the information provided, lack of 
public consultation, and unclear opt-out mechanisms led to public and media concern and 
many patients requesting to opt out of any sharing of their medical records (Carter et al., 
2015; Kirby, 2014). Subsequently, the entire programme was abandoned (Boseley, 2016). 
Care.Data demonstrates the faulty assumptions around knowledge provision and public 
acceptance, as well as providing a cautionary tale around government self-regulation. Further 
to this highly publicised case, a public and professional consultation on data sharing 
conducted by Cameron et al. (2014, p. 5) suggested that “many participants were sceptical of 
the value of informing the general public about the ADRN [administrative data linkage] 
initiative” citing that participants felt publics “would not understand such a complex topic 
through simple messages, and thus would become worried about data security and privacy 
when there is not necessarily a reason to be.” The notion that even communication is not 
needed in data initiatives is concerning. We link these deficit-like assumptions to power 
relations in decentred governance. Assuming that informing publics is enough to gain 
acceptance, is if nothing else, a reflection on the relative power between government, data 
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scientists, and publics where publics are not provided with the option to critique. No matter 
how laudable data sharing initiatives may be, government must allow for spaces of public 
participation that recognise these power imbalances. This also demonstrates a form of public 
engagement where publics self-organised around an issue to contest government practice. 
This is both an example that exposes the imbalance of power between government and 
publics while also demonstrating publics reasserting their call for power in data science 
governance (Braun & Konninger, 2017). And while there is recognition in the literature that 
citizens need decision-making power in data-facilitated engagements like e-participation 
platforms, (Attard, Orlandi, Scerri, & Auer, 2015; Gagliardi et al., 2017), in practice 
engagement on data governance is still limited to communication.  
5.3 Proposition Three: Determine the contingencies of trust for government data science 
and public engagement through trustworthy practice 
Debates around trust, accountability, and transparency have also begun in the realm of 
data science. One key form of new data, open data, rests on the ideal of transparency (Levy & 
Johns, 2016; O'Hara, 2012; Schrock, 2016). While open data covers any form of publicly 
accessible dataset, O'Hara (2012, p. 4) argues that it specifically offers “the possibility of 
holding government accountable.” A key focus in the UK government’s recently announced 
algorithmic decision-making inquiry is “how algorithmic decision-making can be conducted 
in a ‘transparent’ or ‘accountable’ way” (Commons Select Committee, 2017). Transparency 
in data practices is connected to ideals of accountability while also enabling people to engage 
with data science (Attard et al., 2015). However, this assumes publics have the resources, 
skills, and finances to use and interpret the data provided. Arguably, with highly specialist 
technologies like data science,  this is often not the case (Levy & Johns, 2016). In practice, as 
Attard et al. (2015, p. 414) reflects, while “the benefits of open data outweigh the efforts 
required, it appears there is a lack of public participation in open government initiatives.” The 
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open data to accountability perspective has largely been critiqued as being naïve, in fact 
Johnson (2014) argues that ‘opening up data can function as a tool of disciplinary power’ (pg. 
270) and further suggests open data theorists move to a perspective of information justice, 
which ‘can be especially useful in overcoming the capabilities gaps between enterprises and 
individuals…and make information pluralism a reality (p. 272). While not an argument for 
public engagement per se, it is a perspective that allows for the socio- to reintegrate to 
technical systems.  
In terms of considering the various contingencies and contexts of trust in data science, 
it is challenging to divorce views of government from views of government data practice. In a 
public consultation on data linking, Cameron et al. (2014, p. 14) found that “participants 
trusted government’s intentions more than commercial companies” and yet “[participants] 
were also worried about personal data being leaked, lost, shared or sold by government 
departments to third parties.” They concluded that “[l]ow trust in government more generally 
seemed to be driving these views” (Cameron et al., 2014, p. 22). It is challenging to 
distinguish what publics may use as reference points to evaluate data risks. Cameron et al. 
(2014) suggest that media events, like the revelations of Edward Snowden and Julian 
Assange, drive the belief that data can never be truly secure. In a widely publicised case in 
the UK, Google subsidiary DeepMind developed a collaboration agreement with the NHS 
Royal Free Trust gaining access to millions of identifiable patient records. While they 
claimed to only be accessing these records to provide an app that identifies acute kidney 
(AKI) patients, as Powles and Hodson (2017) discuss there were in fact no real limitations on 
what they could do with the data, nor any transparency in what they were actually doing. In 
addition, patients were enrolled based on a principle of implied consent due to the app being 
involved in direct care, beyond being a shaky assumption on any grounds, implied consent 
would only be in effect for those patients with AKI (Powles & Hodson, 2017). After the New 
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Scientist revealed the problematic latitude of this agreement (N.A., 2016) Google and 
DeepMind published press releases highlighting the small scope of the project in order to 
reassure publics. Despite, or perhaps due to, these minimal post hoc attempts at public 
participation this data science collaboration remains under scrutiny.  
It is events like these, where untrustworthy practice comes to light, that are likely to 
drive public perceptions of data science. UK governments have made some efforts to define 
how publics feel about data. Examples include the Cabinet Office’s Government Digital 
Service consultation on what the ‘red lines’ are in ethical use of data science (Gov.UK Blog, 
2015; Sciencewise, 2012, 2014). In 2015, the Office for National Statistics and the Wellcome 
Trust held a series of deliberative workshops with general publics and specialist groups to 
identify how people felt about commercial access to health data (Ipsos MORI, 2016). 
Government-commissioned reports on public views of data have been implemented or funded 
by the Economic and Social Research Council , Ipsos MORI , the Scottish Government, 
Sciencewise , the Cabinet Office  and more (Cameron et al., 2014; Davidson et al., 2013; 
Gov.UK Blog, 2015; Ipsos MORI, 2006, 2016; Sciencewise, 2012, 2014). While these 
activities represent a step toward establishing publics’ views on various aspects of data 
science, they do not equate nor reflect public influence. Despite how they may be designed 
around finding the ethical lines of data science, these are not sufficient for public engagement 
nor do they overcome untrustworthy practice in other areas. In fact these consultations 
evidence a lack of any kind of decentred governance. Particularly in the Google DeepMind 
case, they evidence attempts to ‘get around’ public engagement rather than critical inward 
reflections on trustworthy practices that could enable public engagement. Thus the main tenet 
of decentred governance that regulation of data science would occur beyond central 
government can only be built upon trustworthy practice. 
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5.4 Proposition Four: Design public engagements that incorporate robust, critical, and 
ongoing deliberation of data science 
As data is already intertwined with publics, creating more robust models of public 
ownership of personal data could move governments beyond simply conducting one-off 
events. The ongoing embedded nature of public data practices calls for designing innovative 
engagement exercises that reflect how data science is increasingly a part of day-to-day life. 
Opportunities for involving publics in data collection, use, and governance abound. Examples 
include citizen science initiatives that crowd-source data processing (Bonney et al., 2016; 
Lauriault & Mooney, 2014) and the aforementioned hackathons that leverage the knowledge 
of ‘public professionals’ in typically government-led events to drive data innovation (Sousa, 
2013). Historical exercises in the US like citizen engagement through commenting and rule-
making could, of course, extend to data policies and practices. These efforts allow for open 
public comments on policy drafts, see Johns and Saltane (2016). However, there is the 
potential for more inclusive forms of engagement with data than these limited one-off events. 
Innovative forms of engagement using social media are already in practice (Lee & Kwak, 
2012), however it is important to note that these are often engagements using data 
technologies and not about data science itself.  
There is also an important lesson in thinking critically about the aim of these data 
science engagements. Substantive forms of engagement should have the possibility to make a 
difference and to enable publics to have impact on the processes of data science. As Malik 
(2013, p. 6) describes, “[the] first  step of the journey toward Big Data governance involves 
stakeholder engagement”. As government is facing increasingly complex challenges in how 
to regulate their own use of data science technologies, innovative and multiple venues for 
public participation can help government address broader questions around ethical and 
beneficial data science. The technical knowledge required for conducting data science is 
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obviously also a limitation, and thus focussing on ethical questions would allow broader 
engagement. This will require new and innovative forms of public engagement that allow for 
sites of contestation and pluralism, this ‘means that participation in science governance takes 
place in a multiplicity of sites’ (Braun & Konninger, 2017, p. 10). And while it is impossible 
to predict where these sites of contestation will develop, public engagement that is robust, 
critical, and ongoing allows public engagement to be less about shutting down public 
opposition and more about opening up debate (Stirling, 2004). 
5.5 Proposition Five: Ensure holistic public participation that moves beyond privacy and 
consent  
What is the future imaginary of data? Thus far the topics of data science engagement 
have focussed on privacy and consent (Joseph & Johnson, 2013; Schintler & Kulkarni, 2014; 
Stough & McBride, 2014). For example, Cameron et al.’s (2014) Dialogue on Data sought 
“to explore public understanding and views of administrative data and data linking”. Limiting 
public engagement to discussions around privacy and consent sets a tight boundary for public 
influence, and can be seen as a way of shutting down potential areas for conversation and 
contestation. We suggest a future horizons perspective where there is an opportunity for 
government to involve publics in creating an imaginary of the data future. More than 
upstream deliberation or building robustness, government can think about the way publics 
can be involved in the ideology that drives the use of data science in policy, and the kinds of 
data that are created. This can be achieved through more inclusive and early engagement. As 
Kennedy, Poell, and van Dijck (2015, p. 6) argue, ‘[to] participate in datafied social, political, 
cultural and civic life, ordinary people need to understand what happens to their data, the 
consequences of data analysis, and the ways in which data-driven operations affect us all.’ 
We would go further to add that ‘ordinary people’ need to be understood as the key 
stakeholder in a datafied world. Publics need to be engaged in how they imagine data, what 
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sorts of information they see as useful, how they think data could be used, and most 
importantly in how they wish the future to look. Only through this kind of decentralized 
governance with data science can the issue of government self-regulation be addressed.  
6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 Strengths, limitations, and academic contribution 
This is the first article to offer propositions for government data science public 
engagement practice that are rooted in concrete and empirical lessons from public 
engagement literature. This is also the first narrative literature review of public engagement 
with new technology to critically describe and synthesise these lessons. We suggest both 
academic scholars and government could build on these lessons to develop effective public 
engagement activities. A potential limitation of this approach is that we did not conduct a 
systematic review of the literature and the lessons found here could be strengthened and 
enhanced by further systematic reviews of public engagement in the future. As well this 
article focuses on introducing the reader to the field of public engagement, a more critical and 
theory-driven approach could be used in future. Particularly, an approach that reviewed 
public-government interactions in areas not related to science and technology may be useful. 
And finally, while this article focussed on engagement related to data science, these lessons 
may be useful to other fields of data  and digital technologies including concepts like big 
data, open data, and machine learning.  
6.2 Final thoughts 
The increasing use of data science in policymaking is creating new spaces for public 
engagement. These new opportunities can create confusion on how and where to effectively 
engage publics in the development and regulation of data science. We synthesised five 
themes from 49 articles that focussed on public engagement with new technology. These 
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themes were then used to develop five novel propositions for public engagement with 
government data science. This includes considering the varied and many ‘publics’ who may 
be engaged in government data science, not assuming that providing publics with information 
on data science initiatives will lead to public acceptance, determining the contingencies of 
trust for government data science and public engagement through trustworthy practice, and 
designing public engagements that incorporate robust, critical, and ongoing deliberation of 
data science. Our final proposition is to ensure holistic public participation that moves 
beyond privacy and consent. This highlights the importance of recognising that publics have 
an interest in how and why government uses data science. In particular they are due a role in 
decided what government should use data science for. Government has a unique opportunity 
to allow publics in decision-making spaces around how data is created, collected, and utilised 
for the good of society. Data is a public matter. It is the next steps that government take that 
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